Warning Tier

ELEVATED — held. Downgrade criterion: 14 consecutive days without a JCRP or named exercise. Last JCRP: 17 Sep 2026. Day 11 of 14-day clock as of this report. Earliest WATCH eligibility: 1 Oct 2026 — coincides with PRC National Day. Clock pauses if any named exercise occurs.

PLA Activity — Sep 25–28

26 Sep: 5 sorties (ROC MND), 5 PLAN vessels, 2 official vessels; 3 of 5 aircraft crossed the median line; SW and E ADIZ. Visit-period lull continues — no exercise designation, no JCRP. This is the fourth consecutive day below the Aug–Sep elevated baseline.

26 Sep — CCG Kinmen: Chinese Coast Guard vessels entered the restricted waters around Kinmen Island twice. Pattern established Feb 2026; each entry is routine by PRC design. No inspection zone declared; no shipping NOTAM.

Days 25, 27, 28 Sep: ROC MND has not issued reports as of filing. Consistent with summit-period lull.

H1 2026 sortie total: 1,334 aircraft Jan–Jun — 52% below H1 2025. Sep 26 pace (5 sorties/day) consistent with the depressed H1 baseline rather than the Aug–Sep exercise spikes.

PRC National Day — 1 Oct 2026

Oct 1 is the earliest date ELEVATED could downgrade to WATCH. It is also PRC National Day — a politically significant date that has historically corresponded with elevated PLA posture. Precedents: Joint Sword-2024B (14–15 Oct 2024, 2 days after ROC National Day); Justice Mission-2025 (29–30 Dec 2025). No exercise has been announced. Monitor ROC MND reports 1–5 Oct closely.

ROC National Day: 10 Oct 2026 — second elevated-risk window within the post-summit observation period.

Washington Summit Residual — Status Board

Xi "oppose" formulation: Xi called on the US to shift from "does not support Taiwan independence" to "opposes" — a first public presidential demand. White House omitted Taiwan from its readout; Trump did not answer on-record. No adoption, no rejection as of 28 Sep. Track: any administration statement referencing the formulation is a material development.

$14B arms package: not released at or after the Sep 24 summit. Status unchanged — Trump holding "in abeyance" as a negotiating chip (Aug 2026). McConnell/Cornyn/Murkowski/Tillis letter Sep 24 to Rubio and Hegseth requesting release of $300M FMF, $1B TSCI, $14B FMS. No response as of filing.

Trade truce: extended to 10 Jan 2027 (Bessent, Sep 23). Rare earths and farm goods commitments remain unmet.

CCG East-of-Taiwan Patrol

Month 4. Current rotation: Putuoshan (lead) / Daishan (support), positions 74–105 nm east of Green Island. Taiwan CGA Taipei shadowing. No inspection zone; no shipping-closure NOTAM. Rotation is calendar-driven; fifth rotation expected within 3–4 weeks.

Structural Inflections — Next 45 Days

  • 1 Oct — PRC National Day; earliest WATCH eligibility; ELEVATED clock resolves this date if no intervening exercise
  • 10 Oct — ROC National Day; elevated-risk window
  • 10 Jan 2027 — trade truce expiry
  • HIMARS delivery: Q4 2026 (on schedule)
  • PORCUPINE Act House floor vote: no date scheduled
  • Drone Act MoEA implementing regulations: no timeline

Polymarket Odds

As of 20–21 Sep 2026 (last available data; unchanged in the three days since):

Before 1 Jan 2027: ~4% ($42.4M volume)  |  Military clash before 31 Dec 2026: 7.1%  |  Before 30 Jun 2027: ~9.5%  |  Before 31 Dec 2027: ~11.5%

Assessed Invasion Probability

Unchanged from prior assessment. ELEVATED tier sustained; post-summit lull is tactical (FDD Aug 25: PLA de-escalation during summits is standing practice, not strategic revision). ODNI Mar 2026: PRC leaders "lack plans for an invasion."

1 month: 2–4% — summit lull, no imminent trigger; National Day risk acknowledged but no announcement
6 months: 5–7% — unchanged; contingent on "oppose" formulation not hardening US posture
1 year: 10–13% — CMPR Dec 2025 "fight and win by end 2027" window enters horizon
5 years: 18–24% — INDSR 2035 higher-risk than 2027; blockade/quarantine weighted 2–3× invasion within this figure