Warning Tier

ELEVATED — sustained. Sep 5 named-exercise trigger remains in force; Sep 9 second JCRP four days later removes the de-escalation signal observed on Sep 7. Sep 14 activity (14 sorties, 11/14 crossing median) confirms no reversion to low-tempo baseline. Tier review: Sep 24 Xi–Trump summit outcome.

PLA Activity — Sep 8–14

9 Sep — ROC MND press release: 16 sorties of PLA aircraft (J-10, Su-30, JH-7, Y-8 EW, KJ-500), starting 09:22. 11 of 16 crossed the median line, entering Taiwan's northern, central, and eastern ADIZ. Coordinated with PLAN vessels. PRC designation: Joint Combat Readiness Patrol — the second JCRP of 2026, four days after the first (Sep 5). ROC MND issued a separate press release; pattern consistent with Sep 5 framing.

14 Sep — ROC MND daily report (as of 06:00 Taipei time): 14 sorties of PLA aircraft, 6 PLAN vessels, 8 official ships. 11 of 14 sorties crossed the median line, entering Taiwan's northern and southwestern ADIZ. No exercise designation in the morning report.

Significance: Two named exercises (JCRP) in four days marks the highest density of designated events since the Apr 2023 "Joint Sword" series. The Sep 5 + Sep 9 sequence breaks the spike-then-rapid-de-escalation pattern observed throughout 2026 (Jul 30 JCRP preceded by 5 days of near-zero activity; Aug 5 high event followed by three consecutive zero-sortie days). The Sep 14 activity — 14 sorties at elevated median-crossing rate (79%) — occurs five days after the second JCRP with no intervening zero days confirmed in reporting.

Sep 5–14 in Context

5 Sep: 20 sorties / dual JCRP+Air-Sea Joint Drill / 17/20 median  |  7 Sep: 2 sorties / 13 PLAN  |  9 Sep: 16 sorties / JCRP / 11/16 median  |  14 Sep: 14 sorties / 11/14 median

The brief de-escalation on Sep 7 (2 sorties) did not signal a return to baseline. The week-on-week cadence of Sep 9 and Sep 14 events, combined with sustained CCG presence east of Taiwan (Xiushan-led formation, unchanged positions), is consistent with intentional pressure in the days preceding the Sep 24 summit rather than post-exercise stand-down.

CCG East of Taiwan

Xiushan (2305)-led formation status: no change. Taiwan CGA vessel Taipei continuing to shadow. No inspection-zone declaration; no shipping NOTAM. The institutionalised rotation pattern (announced, presented as routine) continues.

Diplomatic and Arms

Xi–Trump White House summit: Sep 24 — 10 days out. Beijing has reportedly continued to press Washington to defer announcement of the $14B arms package before the summit, with China stalling follow-up Pentagon visits to create leverage. Arms sale status: paused — Trump's Aug 2026 "negotiating chip" framing unchanged. No White House reversal detected.

PORCUPINE Act H.R.7146: House floor vote remains unscheduled. HIMARS delivery Q4 2026: on schedule. PAC-3 MSE: deliveries underway. NT$780B special defense budget and NT$240B Drone Act (MoEA authority): both passed; implementation regulations pending.

Taiwan allies: 12, no switch. Trump–Lai call: deferred indefinitely.

Polymarket

Invasion before Sep 30, 2026: ~1%  |  Before Jan 1, 2027: ~4%  |  Before Dec 31, 2027: ~11%

Probability Assessment

The two-JCRP sequence is a qualitative escalation signal and sustains ELEVATED. It does not shift the quantitative probability estimate without additional structural indicators (exercise with no end-date, CCG inspection-zone declaration, force generation at amphibious bases). Market consensus and strategic intelligence remain well below the ELEVATED probability band (8–15%).

1 month: 2–4%  |  6 months: 5–7%  |  1 year: 10–13%  |  5 years: 18–24%

Ranges endorsed Jul 20 editorial. Unchanged.

Next Inflections

Xi–Trump White House Sep 24 (10 days; tier review) · $14B arms sale (contingent on summit) · PORCUPINE Act House floor vote (no date) · HIMARS delivery Q4 2026 · Drone Act MoEA implementing regulations · 2027 Party Congress.