PLA Activity — Jul 14–20

This week saw low-to-moderate PLA activity with no high-sortie events. All detected activity consistent with sustained gray-zone patrol cadence.

Jul 14: 3 sorties / 6 PLAN vessels / 8 official ships — 3/3 crossed median line; N + SW ADIZ.
Jul 15: 6 sorties / 7 PLAN vessels / 3 official ships — 1/6 entered eastern ADIZ (Pacific sector).
Jul 19: 10 sorties / 9 PLAN vessels / 3 official ships — 8/10 crossed median line; N ADIZ.
Jul 20: 2 sorties / 7 PLAN vessels / 1 official ship — 2/2 crossed median line; N ADIZ.

No confirmed surge events (≥20 sorties) Jul 14–20. Jul 15 activity is notable for the eastern ADIZ vector — Pacific-side penetration rather than the more common median-line / SW pattern. ROC Armed Forces employed CAP aircraft, Navy ships, and coastal missile systems in response on all reported days.

Monthly context: March 2026 recorded 171 PLA sorties — the lowest monthly figure since the post-Pelosi surge of August 2022. PRC has reverted to a pre-Lai-inauguration baseline tempo since January 2026, after doubling monthly volumes to 300+ following Lai's May 2024 inauguration.

CCG East-of-Taiwan — Patrol Institutionalized

CCGS Xiushan continues standing patrol ~54 nm east of Hualien. The Jul 4 rotation from CCGS Daishan confirmed this is a permanent standing patrol, not a time-limited operation. Taiwan CGA is maintaining two-vessel shadow coverage. No additional CCG vessels or new incidents Jul 14–20. US, France, Germany, and UK have all formally lodged concern; no additional statements this week.

CCG east-of-Taiwan patrol now assessed as institutionalized — a permanent jurisdictional assertion in Taiwan's Pacific approaches. See Special Editorial (20 Jul 2026) for quarantine/blockade threshold implications.

Polymarket Odds

Before Jan 1, 2027 (invasion): 3.75% — $38.6M volume ↓ from ~4–5% (Jul 13)
Military clash before Jan 1, 2027: ~12.5% — unchanged
By Dec 31, 2027 (invasion): ~12% — $1.7M volume

The before-2027 invasion contract has declined from ~7.5% in mid-2026 to 3.75% as of Jul 19–20. The prior 2025 spike to ~30% (heightened strait tensions, late 2025) has fully reverted. The 2027-horizon contract at ~12% reflects residual longer-term risk, not near-term operational signal.

Assessed Invasion Probability

No material new intelligence this week. Assessed ranges unchanged from Jul 13. Current warning tier: BASELINE (see Special Editorial for full tier definitions and escalation criteria).

1 month: 1–2% — No PLAN deployment surge, no logistics mobilization, no civil aviation restriction signals detected.
6 months: 5–7% — Consistent with Polymarket mid-horizon implied rates; Xi–Trump Sep 24 summit a near-term stabilizing signal.
1 year: 10–13% — ODNI Mar 2026: PRC leaders "lack plans for an invasion." No fixed timeline confirmed.
5 years: 18–24% — Quarantine/blockade scenarios weighted 2–3× full invasion within this figure. CMPR Dec 2025: "fight and win by end 2027" operational target, not confirmed launch order.

Arms Sales & Diplomatic Status

No changes this week to any tracked items. $14B package (PAC-3, NASAMS, HIMARS, M109A7) remains under executive review. PORCUPINE Act (H.R.7146): no House floor vote scheduled following May 13 HFAC 45-0 advance. Senate S.1744 passed Dec 2025, unchanged. Xi–Trump White House summit confirmed Sep 24. Trump–Lai call deferred indefinitely. Taiwan diplomatic ally count: 12, no switch Jul 14–20.

Next structural inflections: Xi–Trump White House Sep 24 · PORCUPINE Act House floor vote (no date) · LY drone budget (joint committee) · Hai Kun 2nd-boat freeze (pending) · 2027 Party Congress