PLA Air Activity — Jun 30–Jul 6

Jul 4 (US Independence Day): 30 sorties — 26 crossed median line. Aircraft types confirmed: J-16, H-6, KJ-500. Active across northern, central, southwestern, and eastern ADIZ sectors simultaneously. 7 PLAN vessels, 5 official ships. Week high; consistent with prior PLA practice of timing gray-zone peaks to US national holidays.

Jun 30: 2 sorties, 10 PLAN vessels, 3 official ships — no median-line crossings.
Jul 1: 13 sorties — 9/13 crossed median line (N, SW, E ADIZ); 10 PLAN vessels, 3 official.
Jul 2: 5 sorties — 2/5 crossed (SW ADIZ); 6 PLAN vessels.
Jul 3: 13 sorties — 9/13 crossed median line (N, SW, E ADIZ); 10 PLAN vessels, 3 official.
Jul 5: 8 sorties — 6 entered SW ADIZ; 10 PLAN vessels, 7 official ships.
Jul 6: 5–6 sorties; 3–4 entered SW/E ADIZ; 5–8 PLAN vessels.

Week cumulative: ~82–84 sorties. Median-line crossings on every day except Jun 30. ROC Armed Forces responded with CAP aircraft, Navy vessels, and coastal missile systems on all detected instances.

CCG — East-of-Taiwan Standing Patrol Institutionalized

Jul 4: China Coast Guard rotated CCGS Xiushan into eastern-Taiwan waters, replacing CCGS Daishan. Two CCG vessels tracked ~54 nm east of Hualien. The rotation confirms the eastern patrol is now standing and permanent — not episodic. Bloomberg and regional wire services explicitly characterized it as institutionalization of a new maritime presence.

Taiwan CGA deployed two vessels to shadow. Taiwan CGA publicly instructed Taiwanese mariners to ignore CCG boarding demands; CGA stated it would intervene "if required." Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council: China has "no sovereignty or related rights" in waters east of Taiwan. US, France, Germany, and UK expressed concern. PRC framing (Xinhua): "routine law enforcement patrols" covering fisheries protection and rescue.

Kinmen: CCG conducted restricted-waters patrol Jun 30, consistent with near-monthly cadence since Feb 2024. No new "special law enforcement operation" matching the Jun 7–11 pattern detected this cycle.

Arms Sale / Diplomatic Status

$14B arms package (PAC-3, NASAMS, HIMARS, M109A7, army/navy missiles): Still under review as of Jul 6. No approval or rejection confirmed. Rubio's "under review, not paused" framing (Jun 4) and Hung Cao's Iran-war inventory rationale (May 22) remain the operative — and mutually incompatible — official positions. No new statement from Hegseth or Rubio this week. Existing undelivered US arms backlog: ~$30B.

Trump–Lai call: Not held. Trump conducted Independence Day calls with Putin (~85 min) and Zelensky; no call with Lai. Call appears indefinitely deferred ahead of Sep 24 Xi–Trump White House meeting.

PORCUPINE Act (H.R.7146): House floor vote not scheduled. House entered July 4 recess early following SAVE America Act stalemate. No Majority Leader scheduling signal for H.R.7146 found. Senate companion S.1744 passed Dec 2025 (unchanged). Co-leads: Wittman (R-VA), Davis (D-NC), Bera (D-CA), Mackenzie (R-PA).

LY drone budget (Jul 3): Four competing drone procurement bills (NT$210–240B, 2026–2031) referred to joint Finance / Economics / Foreign Affairs & National Defense committee review. DPP version: NT$210B special budget. KMT: NT$240B ceiling via general budget. TPP: no cap. No floor vote yet.

Hai Kun 2nd-boat freeze (NT$11.9B): KMT proposal still pending LY floor vote; no vote confirmed this cycle. LY legislative attention concentrated on drone bill.

Xi–Trump White House (Sep 24): Confirmed, no changes.

Taiwan allies: 12 (11 UN members + Vatican). No diplomatic switch Jun 30–Jul 6.

Polymarket Odds

Invasion before Jan 1, 2027: ~6% ($38M+ volume)  |  Military clash before 2027: ~12.5%  |  By Jun 30, 2027: ~12.5%  |  By Dec 31, 2027: ~14.5% (↓ from ~16.5%)

ODNI March 2026 Annual Threat Assessment: PRC leaders "lack plans for an invasion" and maintain no fixed unification timeline; no observable amphibious mobilization detected.

Assessed Invasion Probability

1 month: 1–2% — no mobilization indicators; post-Independence Day drawdown expected to follow.
6 months: 5–7% — Sep 24 Xi–Trump meeting creates political tail risk without PLAN readiness indicators.
1 year: 10–13% — 2027 Party Congress creates political incentive absent military necessity.
5 years: 18–24% — structural risk elevated by CCG institutionalization east of Taiwan and gray-zone normalization.

Next Structural Inflections

Thai/Brunei/Philippines visa-free expiry — Jul 31 (no renewal announced)  ·  PORCUPINE Act House floor vote — no date set  ·  LY drone budget vote — pending joint committee  ·  Hai Kun 2nd-boat freeze vote — pending  ·  Xi–Trump White House — Sep 24  ·  2027 Party Congress