PLA Military Activity — June 20–28

Taiwan MND daily reports show a mid-to-late June escalation followed by a sharp drop-off:

Jun 22: 23 sorties / 7 PLAN + 5 official ships — 20 of 23 entered ADIZ. Period high.
  • Jun 20: 5 sorties — 1 crossed median line
  • Jun 23: 6 sorties — 3 crossed median line
  • Jun 24: 11 sorties — 3 crossed median line
  • Jun 25: 14 sorties — 10 of 14 crossed median line
  • Jun 26: 2 sorties / 6 vessels
  • Jun 27: 1 sortie / 7 vessels
  • Jun 28: 0 sorties / 6 vessels — no aircraft detected

The Jun 20–25 tempo exceeds the Jun 12 peak (14 sorties) reported two weeks prior. Jane's reporting characterizes the broader 2026 trend as China setting new records in air-sea operations around Taiwan; the Jun 26–28 falloff to near-zero aircraft activity matches the post-surge drawdown pattern observed after the May and early-June peaks.

$14B Arms Sale — Lai Calls for Approval

President Lai stated on June 18 that he hopes the US will approve the $14B arms package "as soon as possible" — the first direct Taipei statement on the freeze captured in this reporting window. Rubio's "under review, not paused" framing (Jun 4) and Hegseth's "very good place" stockpile comments remain unchanged. No resumption date has been announced.

PORCUPINE Act — No Floor Vote; Stalled in Committee

No record of a House floor vote exists for H.R.7146 despite the Jun 8 schedule reported previously. Congress.gov shows no floor action beyond the May 13 HFAC committee vote (45–0). Status: pending, not advanced beyond committee as of June 29. Senate companion S.1744 passed by unanimous consent December 2025.

Trump–Lai Call — Still Not Held

No call occurred between June 15–29. Status unchanged from prior reporting.

Cable-Sabotage Case — First Sentencing

The Chinese national captaining the Togo-flagged vessel Hong Tai 58 — which severed the Taiwan–Penghu No. 3 undersea cable in February 2025 — was sentenced to prison by a Taiwan court in June 2026. This is the first instance of Taiwan imposing a custodial sentence in a cable-sabotage case.

Submarine Budget — Clarification

KMT legislator Ma Wen-chun has proposed a full freeze of NT$11.9B for follow-on construction of the second Hai Kun-class submarine — distinct from the NT$295B figure previously reported, which covers the first tranche of the broader US arms-purchase special budget within the NT$780B/2026–2033 framework. No final Legislative Yuan vote on the submarine freeze has been confirmed as of June 29.

Polymarket — Invasion Odds (late June 2026)

By Jun 30, 2026~0% ($11.9M volume)
Before end of 20265.85% (↓ from 6.3%; recent peak 7.45%)
By Jun 30, 2027~12.5% (unconfirmed this cycle)
By Dec 31, 2027~16.5% (unconfirmed this cycle)

Assessed Invasion Probability

1 month (by Jul 29) — 1–2% — Jun 22–25 sortie surge is intense but consistent with established gray-zone signaling pattern, not pre-invasion staging; Xi White House visit (Sep 24) functions as near-term stabilizer.
6 months (by Dec 29) — 5–7% — Arms freeze and PORCUPINE Act stall marginally degrade deterrence signaling; post-Xi-meeting window carries residual risk.
1 year (by Jun 29, 2027) — 9–12% — 2027 Party Congress and PLA modernization timeline remain primary structural drivers.
5 years (by Jun 29, 2031) — 15–22% — Structural pressure trajectory, ally attrition, and US commitment ambiguity compound over horizon.

Standing Signals — Unchanged

Xi-Trump White House visit remains September 24, 2026. NT$8.81B HIMARS tranche secured May 29. Taiwan ally count: 12 (11 UN members + Vatican), unchanged. No new China Coast Guard "special law enforcement operation" matching the Jun 7–11 pattern detected in this window.

Structural Inflections — Next Window

PORCUPINE Act House floor vote (still pending, no date set) · Art. 28–29 activation: Jun 30 · Thailand/Brunei/Philippines visa-free expiry: Jul 31 · Hai Kun-class second submarine budget vote (pending) · Xi-Trump White House: Sep 24 · 2027 Party Congress