PLA Military Activity — June 8–14
Taiwan MND daily reports for the period:
- Jun 9: 1 sortie / 6 PLAN + 9 official — 1 entered SE ADIZ
- Jun 13: 6 sorties / 8 PLAN + 2 official — 4 entered SW ADIZ
- Jun 14: 1 sortie / 5 PLAN + 2 official (partial-day report)
Jun 10–11 data not separately reported in MND open-source releases during the CCG operation window (see below). Activity is below the May peak (29 sorties, May 26) and consistent with the post-exercise drawdown pattern observed through early June.
China Coast Guard — East Taiwan Operation Concluded
China's coast guard concluded a "special maritime law enforcement operation" east of Taiwan on June 10–11, following a deployment that began June 7. During the operation, CCG vessels inspected 198 ships and conducted hydrographic surveys in waters east of Taiwan. Beijing framed the operation as a protest against Japan-Philippines discussions to delimit maritime boundaries in adjacent waters. Taiwan's coast guard deployed vessels in response and issued a formal sovereignty statement: "Our nation's maritime sovereignty cannot be violated. Any country that asserts jurisdiction will be expelled without exception."
$14B Arms Sale — Rubio Reframes; Hegseth Contradicts Hung Cao
Secretary of State Rubio described the $14B Taiwan arms package (PAC-3 MSE, NASAMS, IBCS, LTAMDS) as "under review" in statements on June 4–6, a marginal softening from the "paused" and "abeyance" language used since May. Trump has not altered his "negotiating chip" framing. Secretary of Defense Hegseth publicly contradicted Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao: Hegseth stated the US feels "very good" about weapons stockpiles, distancing himself from Hung Cao's May Senate testimony attributing the hold to Operation Epic Fury munitions needs. Taiwan's Presidential Office continues to report no official communication from Washington on the freeze. No resumption date has been announced. Final decision authority remains with Hegseth and Rubio.
PORCUPINE Act — Floor Vote Result Unconfirmed
The PORCUPINE Act House floor vote was scheduled for June 8. No confirmed outcome appears in open-source reporting as of June 15. Senate companion (S.1744) passed by unanimous consent December 2025; HFAC passed H.R.7146 45–0 on May 13.
Trump–Lai Call — Still Pending
No call has occurred. Trump's stated willingness ("I'll always talk to him," June 5) remains unchanged. China continues to publicly oppose direct presidential contact. No scheduling signal has emerged.
Polymarket — Invasion Odds (mid-June 2026)
| By Jun 30, 2026 | 1% |
| Before end of 2026 | 6.3% (↑ from 6.0%) |
| By Jun 30, 2027 | 12.5% (flat) |
| By Dec 31, 2027 | 16.5% (↑ from 15%) |
$806K volume on the Jun 30 market; $709K on the Dec 31 2027 market as of Jun 14. The modest uptick in 2027 timeframe odds likely reflects the combination of sustained arms freeze ambiguity and continued gray-zone pressure expansion.
Assessed Invasion Probability
Standing Signals — Unchanged
Xi-Trump White House visit remains September 24, 2026. NT$295B special procurement sub-budget in continued Legislative Yuan deliberation. NT$8.81B HIMARS tranche secured May 29. Taiwan ally count: 12 (11 UN members + Vatican), unchanged.