Summit Day 2 Outcomes — May 15

The Trump–Xi Beijing summit concluded May 15 with no joint statement. Both sides issued contradictory separate readouts; Al Jazeera headlined "China, US disagree on what they agreed on." Trade deliverables: China committed to purchase 200 Boeing aircraft, U.S. soybeans, LNG, and agricultural goods; both sides agreed on a protocol to prevent non-state access to AI models. Xi confirmed he will visit the White House in late September 2026. Taiwan was absent from all U.S. official written readouts for the second consecutive day.

Trump (Fox News, May 15): "I'll tell you what, it's a very good negotiating chip for us." — on the $14 billion Taiwan arms package, which he confirmed is held "in abeyance." Trump stated he discussed the arms sale with Xi "in great detail" — a potential violation of the 1982 Six Assurances, under which the U.S. committed not to consult Beijing on weapons sales to Taipei.

Additional Trump statements May 15–16: Declined to answer Xi's direct question on whether the U.S. would defend Taiwan ("That question was asked to me today by President Xi. I said I don't talk about that."); warned Taiwan it should "cool it a little bit" and not expect a "blank check" from the U.S. military; stated "I'm not looking to have somebody go independent." On May 16 (Fox interview), called for Taiwan chipmakers to move to the United States and said he expects 40–50% of world semiconductor production to be U.S.-based by end of his term. Secretary of State Rubio (May 14) stated Taiwan "did not feature prominently" in talks and U.S. policy is unchanged.

Taiwan's Response — May 16–17

Taiwan FM Spokeswoman Karen Kuo (May 16): "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent democratic nation, and is not subordinate to the People's Republic of China." U.S. arms sales grounded in the Taiwan Relations Act, "not only a U.S. security commitment to Taiwan." U.S. policy and position toward Taiwan "remain unchanged" per multiple U.S. reaffirmations.

President Lai Ching-te (Facebook, May 17): "Taiwan will not be sacrificed or traded and will not give up its free way of life under pressure." Cited the Taiwan Relations Act as the legal basis for U.S. arms sales regardless of executive discretion. KMT vice-chairman assessed Trump's independence warning as "dealing a blow to the DPP and Lai Ching-te" (Global Times, May 17). Bipartisan U.S. senators continued pressing Trump to advance the $14B package; Senate letter cited Taiwan's passage of its NT$780B special defense budget as eliminating remaining rationale for delay (Taipei Times, May 17).

PLA Activity — May 15–18

Air sorties were suppressed to zero on May 15 (summit Day 2). On May 16, the day after the summit concluded, PLA air activity surged to 26 sorties — the highest single-day count since the May 2 period high — with 16 crossing the median line. Activity partially subsided May 17, then re-elevated May 18.

May 15: 0 sorties / 7 PLAN vessels / 1 official ship (summit day; air activity suppressed).
May 16: 26 sorties / 7 PLAN vessels — 16 crossed median line (northern, central, southwestern ADIZ). Source: @MoNDefense.
May 17: 5 sorties / 7 PLAN vessels / 1 official ship — 4/5 crossed median line (northern, southwestern ADIZ). Source: @MoNDefense.
May 18: 16 sorties / 6 PLAN vessels / 2 official ships — 13/16 crossed median line (northern, southwestern, eastern ADIZ). Source: Taiwan MND.

Prior context: May 14 (summit Day 1): 3 sorties / 6 PLAN / 0 official. May 13: 13 sorties / 7 PLAN / 2 official / 9 crossed median line. The post-summit surge on May 16 (26 sorties) is consistent with Beijing's practice of using elevated military activity as a diplomatic signal adjacent to high-level meetings. No new CCG intrusions into Kinmen restricted waters confirmed since May 8 (last: 4 vessels, ~2h13m).

HIMARS Deadline — 13 Days

May 31 deadline: No payment made as of May 18. NT$800M initial installment due. MND official Chen Wen-hsing confirmed MND is prepared to use its first reserve fund or request Cabinet's second reserve fund if the Legislature does not approve disbursement in time. Missed deadline = case canceled; restart required from initiation.

Taiwan News analysis (May 16) characterized the NT$780B special defense budget as "strategically incomplete": T-Dome air-missile defense system and Strong Bow anti-ballistic missile excluded from the budget; HIMARS and existing U.S. weapons purchases consume the bulk of approved funds. The procedural clause requiring Executive Yuan to submit an LOA report and obtain legislative approval before disbursement cannot be completed before May 31.

Congressional Action

House Foreign Affairs Committee passed the PORCUPINE Act 45–0 (approx. May 14), elevating Taiwan's status in arms exports to that of close U.S. allies (Australia, Israel, Japan) and reducing Congressional notification review to 15 days. Two additional arms-sale streamlining bills also advanced from HFAC. House floor vote scheduled for June 8. No Congressional notification for the $14B arms package has been issued by the executive.

Polymarket Odds — May 17–18

Volume: $23.4M+ on the before-2027 market. Divergence pattern: near-term odds fell post-summit; September deadline ticked higher, suggesting markets price reduced imminent risk but elevated medium-term uncertainty from Trump's "negotiating chip" framing.

Invade by Jun 30, 2026: 1% (↓ from 2%)  |  Invade by Sep 30, 2026: 6% (↑ from 4.5%)  |  Invade before 2027: 7% (stable)  |  Invade by Jun 30, 2027: 14% (stable)  |  Invade by Dec 31, 2027: 17%

Assessed Invasion Probability

Assessed ranges incorporate Polymarket signals, current PLAN disposition, and the deterioration in U.S. deterrence signaling (Trump's "negotiating chip" framing, non-commitment on Taiwan defense, arms deal suspension). No active PLAN exercise buildup detected. HIMARS payment uncertainty marginally increases medium-term deterrence gap risk.

1 month: 1–2% — Jun 30 Polymarket at 1%; no PLAN buildup; post-summit diplomatic window.

6 months: 5–7% — Sep 30 Polymarket ticked to 6%; Trump's arms deal ambiguity weakens deterrence signal through year-end.

1 year: 8–11% — Before-2027 Polymarket at 7%; slight upward revision given U.S. defense commitment clarity degraded; HIMARS delivery timeline at risk.

5 years: 15–22% — Structural factors unchanged; 2027 Party Congress; long-term Taiwan weapons backlog (~$21.5B undelivered) persists.

Next structural inflections: May 31 HIMARS payment deadline; Jun 8 PORCUPINE Act House floor vote; Jun 30 Talent Act Art. 28–29; late Sep Xi–Trump White House meeting; 2027 Party Congress.